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ABSTRACT 
 
Sequential Bargaining in a New-Keynesian Model with 
Frictional Unemployment and Staggered Wage Negotiation*
 
We consider a model with frictional unemployment and staggered wage bargaining where 
hours worked are negotiated every period. The workers’ bargaining power in the hours 
negotiation affects both unemployment volatility and inflation persistence. The closer to zero 
this parameter, (i) the more firms adjust on the intensive margin, reducing employment 
volatility, (ii) the lower the effective workers’ bargaining power for wages and (iii) the more 
important the hourly wage in the marginal cost determination. This set-up produces realistic 
labor market statistics together with inflation persistence. Distinguishing the probability to 
bargain the wage of the existing and the new jobs, we show that the intensive margin helps 
reduce the new entrants wage rigidity required to match observed unemployment volatility. 
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1 Introduction
Real wage and labor market dynamics are crucial for understanding the ination process. Stan-
dard new-Keynesian models contain only a highly abstract description of the labor market which
does not allow for involuntary unemployment and real wage rigidity. These two issues are key
when monetary policy faces complicated trade-o¤ decisions. Search and matching models, on
the other hand, provide a more realistic framework that can be used to analyze unemployment
and wage bargaining situations.
This explains the recent e¤orts to integrate frictional unemployment in new-Keynesian mod-
els with price and wage nominal stickiness. The initial expectation is that the combination of
real and nominal wage stickiness is able to produce endogenous ination persistence, while at
the same time the search and matching frictions can produce realistic labor market outcomes.
This research program faces two major di¢ culties. The rst is related to labor market
modelling: since the contributions of Hall (2005a) and Shimer (2004), it is known that the
standard Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model is not able to produce the observed volatilities
of employment and vacancies. However, these contributions also show that the introduction
of wage rigidities for newly created jobs allows one to circumvent this di¢ culty. Following
their insight, we adopt the Gertler and Trigari (2006) framework and model infrequent wage
bargaining through a time dependent schedule à la Calvo. In addition, we allow nominal wage
rigidity to be di¤erent for existing and newly created jobs. Indeed, these two types of rigidities
have very di¤erent e¤ects on the economy: the rst is especially important to reduce the wage
volatility and enhance ination persistence while the second is crucial for the volatility of labor
market variables. Furthermore, this di¤erentiation is appealing as empirical evidence points
that the wage of newly created jobs are more closely correlated to labor productivity than the
aggregate wage (cf. Haefke et al., 2007).
A second di¢ culty arises from the combination of the search and matching setup with nom-
inal price stickiness. In the standard search and matching model, both capital and labor are
predetermined and prices are the only source of exibility in the short run. Such a market
clearing role for prices is di¢ cult to reconcile with the observed price stickiness and ination
persistence. Several solutions to this problem have been imagined so far. For example, one could
consider that employment can adjust instantaneously, with the inconvenient that it becomes a
jump variable, contrasting with empirical observation.1 Others (e.g. Trigari, 2004 and Walsh,
2005) consider endogenous job destruction with the drawback that most labor adjustment occurs
through the ring channel, in contradiction with the new hiring statistics that show acyclical
job destruction (Shimer, 2007 and Hall, 2005b).2
1Actually, the fact that employment is predetermined or not depends essentially of the time span represented
by one period in the model. On a monthly basis, employment is probably predetermined, but on a quarterly basis
it is rational to consider that it can adjust instantaneously (e.g. Blanchard and Gali, 2006 or Gertler, Sala and
Trigari, 2007).
2This view is however still debated. Some elements of the controversy can be found in Fujita and Ramey (2007)
and Elsby et al. (2008).
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The present paper focuses on an alternative solution allowing labor to adjust at the inten-
sive margin, that is allowing hours worked to be modied along the business cycle. Several
recent papers have worked on this idea3 which actually adapts the labor union literature on
employment bargaining to endogenize the working time decision. Indeed, in the search and
matching literature, unions have no direct inuence on the hiring or ring process: rms decide
alone whether to post a vacancy and most models consider exogenous job destruction. In this
sense, the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides framework is close to the idea of the right-to-manage
(Nickell, 1982). However, within the labor contract long-term relationship, it seems natural that
any decision a¤ecting working time should be discussed by the two parties to the contract.
An important part of the literature on the intensive margin is developed under the assump-
tion that hours and wages are re-bargained every period. In the present paper we want to analyze
the consequences of combining staggered wage bargaining with continuously re-negotiated hours
worked. Indeed, observed collective wage bargaining is infrequent, at least for institutional rea-
sons. Given the medium-to-long run agreement reached for the wage, the workforce can be
adjusted along the business cycle. This adjustment can occur either on the extensive margin,
which is a costly and time-consuming process, or on the intensive margin, but in this case it
is likely to involve some negotiation. This setup is actually very close to the idea of sequential
bargaining introduced by Manning (1987), the main di¤erences being that (i) he considers em-
ployment instead of individual working time and (ii) his wage-employment sequential bargain
happens every period. For the rest, we also allow bargaining power to be di¤erent in the wage
and in the hours negotiations, following the intuition that the workersinuence over di¤erent
aspects may vary widely.4 The chosen timing assumption for the hourly wage and working time
bargainings looks rather realistic. Given a previously bargained hourly wage and according to the
evolution of the global economic situation, rms and workers are likely to adjust their demand
and supply for/of hours. The degree of working time exibility actually depends of institutional
features of the labor market which are captured in this model by the respective rm/worker
bargaining power with respect to hours worked. Noteworthy, the (staggered) wage bargaining
will be a¤ected by the degree of exibility left to rms in the working time management.
This paper is certainly not the rst to combine exible working time with time-dependent
wage bargaining. For example, Christo¤el, Linzert and Kuester (2006) assume that hours are
unilaterally decided by the rm each period and Thomas (2008) considers that the infrequent
non-cooperative nominal wage bargain is based on the anticipation that rms and workers some-
how manage to reach a period-by-period privately e¢ cient working time decision.5 The Thomas
3See for example Moyen and Sahuc (2004), Walsh (2005), Trigari (2004, 2006), Christo¤el and Linzert (2005),
Thomas (2008).
4This can be the case for institutional reasons. For example, in the United States, wages belong to the list of
mandatory issues on which employers have to bargain with unions, while employment and working time are listed
as permissive issues. As examplied by Manning (1987, page 125), the legal structure can play an important role
in di¤erentiating the bargaining power by issues: In the United States strikes at contract renegotiations about
mandatory issues are legal, but strikes about permissive issues in the course of contracts are not.
5 In the remainder of the paper, we will consider for simplicity that this is the outcome of some cooperative
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(2008) model has the advantage to be immune to the Barro (1977) critique since wage is not
allocational for working time within the long-run labor contract relationship. This feature turns
out to be also a drawback as it implies that there is no longer direct link between wage and the
marginal cost. Consequently, both real and nominal wage rigidities a¤ect ination persistence
only through their e¤ect on hours worked. On the other hand, leaving the working time decision
entirely to the rm, as in CLK (2006), leads to a direct link between wage, working time and
the marginal cost. While this provides good performance from the ination persistence point of
view, it leads to very unsatisfactory results regarding labor market statistics. Because of the
huge exibility given to rms, labor adjustments occur mainly on the intensive margin, inducing
unrealistic responses in hours and strongly reducing employment volatility.
Compared with these two ways of modelling the working time decision, the sequential bar-
gaining procedure discussed in this paper displays some interesting features. First, it is fully
coherent with the rules of the non-cooperative game theory. Second, it o¤ers a general set-up of
which the two above mentioned hours setting assumptions are a special case. Indeed, the CLK
(2006) model is obtained simply by setting to zero workersbargaining power relative to the
working time issue. We also display that there exists a value of this bargaining power such that
the working time is independent of the wage and for this parametrization, the model is a fairly
close approximation of Thomas (2008). Finally, for intermediate values of the hours bargaining
power parameter, the sequential bargaining mechanism reduces strongly the incentive of the rm
to adjust on the intensive margin compared to CLK (2006) without a¤ecting the wage-ination
channel.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 of the paper lays out the model, focusing on the
labor market. Apart from the labor market representation, the model encompasses the same
structure and the same set of nominal and real rigidities as the workhorse new-Keynesian model
(e.g. Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)). Section 3
rst discusses the calibration to US data and then simulates the models to study their dynamic
behavior after a productivity and a monetary policy shock. In particular we assess the ability
of the models to match US labor market statistics and to generate ination persistence. The
simulation exercise provides an opportunity to discuss the impact of several parameters such as
the workersbargaining power in the hours negotiation and the Calvo probabilities to bargain
the wage of an existing or of a newly created job. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The production side of the economy is very similar to Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) or
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). We therefore describe it only very briey. The
economy produces an homogenous nal good and a continuum of intermediate goods. The
nal good serves for consumption and investment purposes. The nal good sector is perfectly
behavior.
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competitive. It produces an homogeneous good yt by aggregating a continuum of intermediate
goods indexed by  on the unit interval using a CES Dixit-Stiglitz technology
yt =
Z 1
0
h
yt()
pd
i1=p
. (1)
Each intermediate good is produced by a single rm and sold in a market characterized
by monopolistic competition. Intermediate producers rent capital services ~kt directly from the
households and labor services lt from labor rms and they combine these inputs using a Cobb-
Douglas technology
yt() = "
a
t
h
~kt()
i
[lt()]
1  (2)
where "at represents total factor productivity modelled as an autoregressive process of order 1
"at = ("
a)1 a
 
"at 1
a at with at  iidN .
As we assume constant returns to scale and price-taking behavior on the input markets, the real
marginal cost xt is independent of the price and production levels:
xt =
1
"at

t
1  
1 rkt


(3)
where t and r
k
t represent the competitive price of labor services and capital services respectively.
We consider time-dependent price setting à la Calvo (1983). At each period, each interme-
diate good rm  has a constant probability (1  p) that it will have an opportunity to reset a
new price. This price will prevail for j periods with probability jp. All the intermediate goods
producers who are allowed to reset their selling price at time t face exactly the same optimization
problem and will therefore choose the same optimal price pt . They x it in order to maximize
the expected ow of discounted prots. The producers who cannot change their price are able
to index it on a weighted average of past and trend ination. These assumptions lead to the
following log-linearized new-Keynesian Phillips curve for ination t: 
1 + p
  ^t =   Et^t+1 + p^t 1 + (1  p)(1  p)p x^t (4)
where hats denote variables expressed in percentage deviation from steady state. Parameter
 is the subjective discount factor and p represents the weight given to past ination in the
indexation process.
The labor input of the intermediate goods rms is produced by a continuum of one-worker
labor rms that will be carefully described in section 2.2 below. Let us simply say at this stage
that the labor rms sell homogenous labor services on a competitive market to monopolistic
intermediate producers. This model structure isolates the wage decision from the price decision.
The rest of the section focuses on the household optimisation and the labor market representa-
tion.
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2.1 Households
Households consist of a continuum of workers indexed by  on the unit interval. Workers supply
an homogeneous type of labor, but only a proportion nt of them is employed. Furthermore, em-
ployed workers may receive di¤erent wages and di¤er in their worked hours due to labor market
specicities that will be discussed in subsection 2.2.3 below. Because of our representative -or
large- household interpretation, the unemployment rate ut is identical at the household and ag-
gregate level. As exemplied by Merz (1995), the representative household assumption amounts
to consider state-contingent securities insuring workers against di¤erences in their specic la-
bor income. Family members share their labor income, i.e. wage and unemployment benets,
before choosing per capita consumption, investment, bond holdings and the degree of capacity
utilization.
The representative households total real income is therefore equal to aggregate income
Yt =
Z nt
0
wt()  ht() d + (1  nt)  b+

rkt zt  	(zt)

 kt 1 +t (5)
This is made up of labor income, the return on the real capital stock and prots t generated by
the monopolistic competitive intermediate producer rms and the hiring rms. Labor income is
the sum of the average total wage (the product of hourly wage wt() by hours ht()) and of the
unemployment benet b,6 weighted by the employment-unemployment proportions. Households
hold the capital stock kt 1, a homogeneous production factor, and rent capital services to in-
termediate goods producers at the rental rate rkt . They can adjust the capital supply either by
varying the capacity utilization rate zt or by buying new capital goods which take one period
to be installed. The steady state utilization rate is normalized to 1 and we assume that there is
a cost 	(zt) associated with variations in the degree of capacity utilization
	(zt) =
!
1 + 
h
z1+t   1
i
;
so that 	(1) = 0 while parameter  represents the elasticity of the capital utilization cost
function and ! is a scaling parameter. The capital accumulation process follows
kt = (1  )  kt 1 +
"
1  '
2

it
it 1
2#
 it;
where it is gross investment and  the depreciation rate. We assume quadratic adjustment costs
associated with changes in investment.
Households hold their nancial wealth in the form of bonds Bt: Bonds are one-period se-
curities with price 1=Rt: The budget constraint faced by the representative household may be
written as
Bt
Rt  pt + ct + it =
Bt 1
pt
+ Yt (6)
6 It could alternatively be interpreted as the income generated by the domestic activities of an unemployed
worker.
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where ct represents aggregate consumption and pt is the price index.
We assume separability between leisure and consumption in the instantaneous utility func-
tion. Therefore, all the members of the representative household share the same marginal utility
of wealth and choose the same optimal consumption, even though they do not spend the same
amount of time at work. Adding external consumption habits, the household utility function
can be written
U (ct; ct 1; ht()) = log (ct   e ct 1)   h
R nt
0 [ht()]
1+ d
1 + 
, (7)
with 0 < e < 1 and   0. Let Ht be the value function of the representative household. If we
momentarily leave aside the labor supply decision, its maximization program is
Ht = max
ct;it;Bt;zt
fU (ct; ct 1 ) +   EtHt+1g (8)
The consumers optimal decision results in the following equations for the marginal utility
of consumption t, capital utilization rate, investment and the real value of capital pkt :
t = Et

 Rt t+1
pt
pt+1

; (9)
rkt = ! z

t ; (10)
1 = pkt
"
1  '
2

it
it 1
2#
  Et
(
pkt '
it
it 1
it
it 1
  t+1
t
pkt+1'
it+1
it

it+1
it
2)
; (11)
pkt = Et


t+1
t
h
zt+1 r
k
t+1  	(zt+1) + (1  ) pkt+1
i
: (12)
2.2 Labor market
2.2.1 Labor market ows
We normalize the labor force to one, so that nt represents both the total number of jobs and
the employment rate. This leads to the following accounting identity:
nt + ut = 1 ; (13)
where ut denotes the number of unemployed job-seekers. Let mt denote the number of new
rm-worker matches. We assume that the number of matches is a function of the number of
job vacancies vt and e¤ective job seekers ut, and we consider the following linear homogeneous
matching function:
mt = #m v
#
t u
1 #
t . (14)
For an unemployed worker, the probability of nding a job is given by
jt =
mt
ut
; (15)
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while the probability that a rm lls a vacancy is
qt =
mt
vt
: (16)
An exogenous proportion s of rm-worker relationships terminates each period, which implies
the following employment dynamics:
nt = (1  s)  nt 1 +mt 1 : (17)
2.2.2 One-worker hiring rms
As described above, the labor-hiring rms are intermediaries renting labor services from house-
holds and selling these services to intermediate-goods producers at a hourly rate t on a compet-
itive market. In this sense, their role is very similar to that of the labor packers in the traditional
new-Keynesian model with staggered wages and walrasian labor markets (see Erceg, Levin and
Henderson (2000)). However, instead of aggregating di¤erentiated types of labor, the role of the
hiring rms is to nd workers in the pool of unemployed. Keeping the Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999) assumption that they can hire at most one worker, we consider a continuum of hiring
rms indexed by l, with l distributed over the unit interval.
Labor e¢ ciency is decreasing with hours, so that h hours supplied by one worker produce
only h units of e¤ective labor, with  < 1:7 Consequently, hiring rm l produces either 0 or
[ht(l)]
 units of e¤ective labor and aggregate e¤ective labor can be computed as
lt =
Z 1
0
[ht(l)]
 dl =
Z 1
0
lt() d . (18)
2.2.3 Time-dependent staggered wage setting and exible hours
The hourly wage is assumed to be bargained between the hiring rm and its employee. However,
the wage is not bargained in every period since such negotiations are observed to be infrequent.
According to this, we assume a time-dependent setting à la Calvo wherein each period only a
fraction (1   ow) of all existing wage contracts is renegotiated. All other nominal wages are
simply adjusted for trend ination .
Newly created jobs are paid either the previous-period contract wage or the currently bar-
gained wage with respective probabilities nw and (1  nw). The previous-period contract wage
is a roundabout way to say that the actual wage is drawn out of the wage distribution prevailing
in the previous period and indexed to trend ination. As long as the draw is not realized, the
expected real wage of such a rm is equal to the indexed past average wage wt 1
 pt 1
pt
, with
pt
pt 1 = t. Note that for 
o
w = 
n
w, this assumption is very close to considering a continuum of
7This decreasing returns to scale assumption is particularly important for the determination of working time
in the case where rms decide it unilaterally.
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large rms, each rm paying the same wage to all its workers, as in Gertler and Trigari (2006).8
However, allowing ow 6= nw gives somewhat more exibility. In particular it will prove useful
when assessing the di¤erent roles played by nominal wage rigidity: nw is particularly important
to induce vacancies volatility while ow helps to increase ination persistence.
9 Finally, there is
a growing body of empirical evidence that the wage rigidity for new jobs could be smaller than
this of existing jobs (e.g. Haefke et al. (2007), or Pissarides (2007)).
Even though the wage bargaining will be discussed in detail below, it is important at this
stage to stress that all the hiring rm-worker pairs that are given the opportunity to (re)-
negotiate their wage contract face the same problem and therefore set the same wage. Because
of the time-dependent aspect of wage negotiation, workers may be paid di¤erent wages, even
though they share the same productivity. Furthermore, given the bargained hourly wage, we
allow the rm-worker pair some exibility to react to unexpected shocks by adjusting working
time every period. The exact connection between hours and wages will be described in section
2.2.5 below. At this stage, let us simply assume that hours worked are a function of the real wage.
Formally, wt i
ipt i
pt
denotes the real value at time t of the nominal hourly wage negotiated i
periods earlier while ht(wt i) represents the corresponding hours worked: From the employment
dynamics equation (17), we may express the real value of the average total wage as
ht(wt)  wt = nt 1
nt
(1  s) 

(1  ow)  ht(wt )  wt + ow  ht(wt 1)  wt 1 
pt 1
pt

+
mt 1
nt


(1  nw)  ht(wt )  wt + nw  ht(wt 1)  wt 1 
pt 1
pt

(19)
Note that in the particular case nw = 
o
w = w , i.e. if new hires have the same probability of
bargaining their wage as existing jobs, expression (19) simplies to
ht(wt)  wt = (1  w)  ht(wt )  wt + w  ht(wt 1)  wt 1 

t
;
so that we have a microfounded wage equation similar to the wage rigidities equation proposed
in Blanchard and Gali (2006).
Recursively developing expression (19), we obtain the weightWt i associated with each wage
wt i bargained in the past and its corresponding hours worked:
Wt i =

nt 1 i(1  s)
nt i
(1  ow) +
mt 1 i
nt i
(1  nw)
 i 1Y
j=0

nt 1 j(1  s)
nt j
ow +
mt 1 j
nt j
nw

Average hours worked ht(wt) is then simply computed as:
ht(wt) =
Z nt
0
ht(l) dl =
1X
i=0
ht(w

t i)  Wt i (20)
8Actually the only di¤erence would come from the horizon e¤ect, i.e. the fact that with a continuum of large
rms, the horizon of the labor contract of the worker is smaller than that of the rm since the latter continues
its activity forever. In our one-job-per-rm set-up, rm and worker share the same horizon.
9As illustrated by Bodart and al. (2005), there is a deep interaction between ow and 
n
w : the larger is 
o
w, the
lower nw has to be to induce the same volatility of vacancies.
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2.2.4 Asset values of a job
Let us rst adopt the viewpoint of a labor-hiring rm. We denote Aft (w

t j) the asset value in
period t of a job with a wage that was bargained j periods earlier. It will prove convenient to
recast this value in marginal utility terms, multiplying it by t:
Aft (wt j) = t Aft (wt j) :
The value of a job expressed in marginal utility of consumption may then be written as
Aft (wt j) = t

ht(w

t j)

t   ht(wt j)  wt j 
jpt j
pt

+(1  s) Et
h
(1  ow) Aft+1
 
wt+1

+ ow Aft+1
 
wt j
i
: (21)
where t is the competitive price at which the hiring rm sells labor services to the intermediate
goods rms.
If we now adopt the household viewpoint, the value of a job with a wage bargained j periods
earlier is given by
Vnt (wt j) = ht(wt j) wt j
jpt j
pt
  h
t
h
ht(w

t j)
i1+
1 + 
+(1  s) Et

t+1
t

(1  ow) Vnt+1(wt+1) + ow Vnt+1(wt j)

+s Et

t+1
t
Vut+1

where Vut represents the present value of being unemployed at period t. Formally,
Vut = b+  Et

t+1
t
(1  jt) Vut+1

+ Et

t+1
t
jt

(1  nw) Vnt+1(wt+1) + nw Vnt+1(wt)

and EtVnt+1(wt) is simply the expected value of a new job in the next period if the wage of
the latter is not bargained but drawn out of the previous-period wage distribution. Dening
Aht (wt j) as the household surplus in t (expressed in marginal utility terms) for a job whose
wage is bargained at time t, i.e. Aht (wt j) = t 

Vnt (wt j)  Vut

, we can write
Aht (wt j) = t ht
 
wt j

wt j
jpt j
pt
  h
h
ht

wt j
i1+
1 + 
  tb
+ (1  s) Et
h
(1  ow) Aht+1(wt+1) + ow Aht+1(wt j)
i
   jt  Et
h
(1  nw) Aht+1(wt+1) + nw Aht+1(wt+j)
i
: (22)
9
2.2.5 Wage and hours bargaining
As already noted, all the renegotiating hiring rm-workerpairs face the same problem and
therefore choose the same wage wt . We assume that this wage is decided through a Nash
bargaining procedure, i.e. it solves the following problem
max
wt
h
Aht (wt )
iw hAft (wt )i1 w (23)
where parameter w 2 (0; 1) represents the households bargaining power in the wage negotiation.
The rst-order condition implies the sharing rule:
w  Aft (wt )
dAht (wt )
dwt
= ( 1)  (1  w)  Aht (wt )
dAft (wt )
dwt
; (24)
with
dAht (wt )
dwt
=
@Aht (wt )
@wt
+ Et
1X
i=0
@Aht (wt )
@ht+i(wt )
 @ht+i(w

t )
@wt
(25)
dAft (wt )
dwt
=
@Aft (wt )
@wt
+ Et
1X
i=0
@Aft (wt )
@ht+i(wt )
 @ht+i(w

t )
@wt
(26)
The total derivatives with respect to wage depend on the sequence of expected hours worked
because of the assumption that working time is allowed to adjust every period.
Cooperative hours determination If rms and workers decide to cooperatively set hours
in order to maximize the period joint surplus as in Thomas (2008), working time is
ht =


h
tt
 1
1+ 
(27)
so that working time depends only on macroeconomic variables and the wage is not allocational
for hours, as in a traditional e¢ cient bargaining model with exible wage. Consequently, the
two total derivatives (25) and (26) are identical except for the sign and the optimality condition
for the wage bargain simply states that the ratio of household/rm intertemporal surpluses is
equal to their relative bargaining power. From this expression, it is clear that the competitive
price of labor t only depends on hours worked and the marginal utility of consumption. It is
absolutely not inuenced by the average hourly wage and consequently, the nominal wage rigidity
of existing jobs does not help to increase ination persistence by smoothing the marginal cost.
Non-cooperative hours determination Let us now assume that, given the wage bargained
j periods ago, the two parties to the contract seek to maximize their individual period surplus
through a period-by-period hours negotiation. We allow the worker bargaining power h 2 (0; 1)
in this particular negotiation to be di¤erent from the one on wages (w):
max
ht
 
htw

t j
jpt j
pt
  b  h
t
h1+t
1 + 
!h


htt   htwt j
jpt j
pt
1 h
(28)
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Dening
Ft(w

t j) = (1  h) 
 
htw

t j
jpt j
pt
  b  h
t
h1+t
1 + 
!


th
 1
t   wt j
jpt j
pt

+h 

th
 1
t   wt j
jpt j
pt



htw

t j
jpt j
pt
  h
t
h1+t

, (29)
the rst order condition is obtained for Ft(wt j) = 0.
In the particular case h = 0, the rm retains the right to manage working time and it
equalizes the marginal cost of one unit of time with its marginal revenue. At the other extreme,
if h = 1, the worker supplies labor until the revenue of the marginal hour is equal to its disutility.
The rst derivative of hours with respect to wage is negative for h = 0 and positive for h = 1.
In between, it is monotonically increasing with h, implying that there exists a value of h such
that the wage is not allocational for hours. For this particular value the positive e¤ect of a wage
increase on labor supply is exactly compensated by the negative e¤ect on labor demand. This
can be seen by loglinearizing the rst order condition Ft(wt j) = 0 around the steady state :
h^t(w

t j) =
 
w^t j + p^t j   p^t
 Hw + ^t H + ^t+j H (30)
with Hw =
w Fw
h Fh
, H =
 F
h Fh
and H =
 F
h Fh
(31)
where variables with a hat denote percentage deviation from steady state, the bar above a vari-
able indicates its steady state value and Fx is the derivative of F with respect to x (x = w; ; )
considered at steady state. We can derive
F w = 0, h =
2h w   h   h
h1+
1+   b
h

h1+ + h (1  )  h
h1+
1+   b
.
As long as h is di¤erent from this particular value, the competitive price of labor services t
is directly linked to the hourly wage, a feature some authors call the wage channel(Trigari,
2006, Christo¤el and Linzert, 2005). Since equation (30) holds for any wage, it is also valid for
the aggregate hourly wage wt with the consequence that nominal and real wage rigidities will
directly a¤ect ination persistence.
In the case h = 0 studied by Christo¤el, Kuester and Linzert (2006), we obtain
( 1)Hw = H = 1
1   and H = 0
so that the link between wage and the competitive price of labor is one-for-one. However, this
assumption that the rm is given the right to manage working time implies that the distribution
of individual hours worked is (1  ) 2 times higher than the variance of the distribution of
wage. This is especially large when  is close to unity.
This serious problem can be solved by increasing the household bargaining power in the
working time negotiation. In order to show this, Figure 1 plots the coe¢ cients in the log-
linearized hours equation as a function of workers bargaining power on hours, h. Since a
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change in parameter h implies a modication of the steady state, this graph has been drawn
numerically, using the same calibration as described in section 3.1 below.
Figure 1: coe¢ cients Hw, H and H (equ. 30) as a function of h
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legend: Hw is the solid line, H is the dashed line and H the dotted line
Numerical computation based on the calibration described at section 3.1
The rst observation we can draw from Figure 1 is that the absolute values of the wage and
competitive labor price coe¢ cients decrease rapidly and remain very close to each other as h
increases away from zero. Therefore, an increase of the parameter h helps to reduce strongly the
impact of a change in the bargained wage on the variation (and distribution) of hours while at
the same time, for a fairly wide range of values, it only weakly alters the wage channel. Second,
note that H and H are both equal to 11++ when Hw is equal to zero, which is a property of
the model with cooperatively chosen hours.10 From this we infer that the model with sequential
bargaining and infrequently bargained wages o¤ers a general set-up able to encompass both the
right-to-manage model and a close approximation of the cooperatively chosen hours model as
particular cases.
2.2.6 Job creation and hiring costs
Let Ant represent the asset value of a new job for the rm, which can be written as follows:
Ant = (1  nw) Aft (wt ) + nw Aft (wt 1) : (32)
10This can be easily veried by loglinearizing equation (27).
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The asset value of a vacant job Avt is then given by:
Avt =  cvt + 
t+1
t

qt A
n
t+1 + (1  qt) Avt+1

; (33)
where cvt is the recurrent cost of opening a vacancy. In order to make our results comparable
with Gertler and Trigari (2006), we follow them and assume that the average cost per hire11 is
a linear function of the hiring rate mt=nt:
cvt
qt
= 
mt
nt
(34)
As Yashiv (2006) explains, this assumption emphasizes the cost of incorporating the newly hired
workers into the labor force (e.g. training costs) while the usual constant vacancy posting cost
focuses on the search cost. Considering the free entry condition Avt = 0, equation (33) can be
recast in:

mt
nt
= Et


t+1
t
Ant+1

: (35)
The latter expression makes clear that the dynamics of job creation is leaded by the hiring rate
while with more traditional constant recurrent vacancy posting posting costs, this role is played
by the labor market tightness.
2.3 Market equilibrium and monetary authority behavior
The nal goods market is in equilibrium if production equals demand augmented by the various
adjustment costs. Households consume, invest and incur adjustment costs when adjusting the
rate of capital utilization while hiring rms face vacancy posting costs
yt = ct + it +	(zt)  kt 1 + cvt  vt
The capital market is in equilibrium when the supply of capital services by households
satises the demand for capital of the intermediate goods producers.
The interest rate is determined by a reaction function that describes monetary policy deci-
sions:
Rt = "
r
t Rt 1
0:9



t

1:50:1
; (36)
where "rt is an exogenous monetary policy shock specied as an i.i.d. normal process. In this
simplied Taylor rule, monetary authorities respond to deviations of ination from its objective
. The chosen calibration is standard.
11 In other words, the cost of adjusting the workforce along the extensive margin.
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3 Simulations and model comparison
We divide our simulation exercise in two di¤erent parts. First, we examine the ability of the
models described in the paper to reproduce second moments of the US labor market data after a
productivity shock. The reason why we focus on second moments conditional on a productivity
shock is for comparability with the major paper in the literature addressing the e¤ect of staggered
wages bargaining on employment volatility, i.e. Gertler and Trigari (2006), which is a typical
RBC model. This is particularly relevant in order to show that introducing the intensive margin
in the model in combination with staggered wage bargaining helps decrease the wage rigidity of
newly hired workers to levels that are more consistent with micro-evidence (cf. Haefke et al.,
2007). In a second step, we compare the impulse response functions obtained after a monetary
policy shock for each one of our models. In this exercise, the focus is on the relationship between
unemployment and ination dynamics and how this relationship is a¤ected by h, the workers
bargaining power on hours.
3.1 Calibration
Table 1 displays the value of the parameters that are kept unchanged through the various model
variants in the simulation exercise. In order to properly assess the high rate of job nding that
characterizes the US labor market, we opt for a monthly calibration. The key parameters of the
business cycle literature are calibrated at conventional values: the chosen discount factor implies
an annual steady state real interest rate of 4 percent, capital depreciates by 10% on an annual
basis, the capital share is equal to 0.33 and the autocorrelation of the productivity shock is set
at 0:951=3. Parameters related to the search and matching setup, are mainly calibrated as in
Gertler and Trigari (2006). Since there is no strong evidence on the degree of bargaining power,
we assign equal power to workers and rms (w = 0:5). As usual, the worker bargaining power
on wage is equal to the match elasticity to unemployment (w = 1  #).12 The separation rate
s = 0:035 is standard and supported by strong empirical evidence. The unemployment benet b
is supposed constant and we assume that the replacement ratio (between unemployment benets
and the average wage) is 40 percent: b = 0:4 wh. We also impose that the job-nding rate and
vacancy-lling rate are equal to 0.45 at the steady state (j = q = 0:45). These restrictions
yield the values of #m (matching e¢ ciency) and  (xed part of the vacancy-opening cost).
We impose that the steady state cost of adjusting the workforce is one percent of GDP which
actually amounts to x the steady state wage. However, equation (24) clearly illustrates that
the wage bargain will be very di¤erent as h vary, implying di¤erences in the steady state wage
accross our various variants of the model. In order to avoid this, we adjust the parameter 
accordingly (between 0.953 and 0.977).13 Since we consider the role of the intensive margin, we
12 In a exible model, this condition would guarantee an e¢ cient equilibrium (Hosios (1990) condition).
13The value of  used for each variant is indicated in Table 2. We display in Table 2bis (in Appendix) that
adapting parameter  in order to produce steady state neutral simulations does only marginally a¤ects the
dynamics of the model as displayed through the second-moments of simulated labor variables. But if one does not
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also have to specify some individual parameters. The disutility parameter h is xed to normalize
steady state working time to 1 (h = 1). The labor supply elasticity is xed at 0:5, implying that
parameter  is 2, following the prior set on this parameter by Smets and Wouters (2005, 2007).
Table 1: Calibration common to all the variants (monthly)
Parameters Description Value
business cycle parameters
 discount factor 0.991=3
 capital depreciation rate 0.1/12
 capital share 0.33
a prod. shock AR1 0.95
1=3
search and matching
s job destruction rate 0.035
w worker bargaining power (wage) 0.5
# vacancies elasticity 0.5
b unemployment benets w  0:4
j job nding probability 0.45
q vacancy lling probability 0.45
cvv
y vacancy cost as a share of GDP 0.01
hours
 hours disutility elasticity 2
h hours 1
 hours decreasing return to scale cf. Table 2
Real and nominal rigidities
e consumption habit 0.7
 capital utilization cost elasticity 1
! capital utilization cost weight 0.012
 long run ination 1.002
1
1 p CES production technology 10
p price rigidity 0.87
1=3
 indexation parameter 0.5
ow prob. to bargain an existing job wage 0.7
1=3
The parameters representing the real and nominal rigidities that are at the core of the
new generation of monetary models are calibrated following the priors considered by Smets and
Wouters (2005, 2007).14 We set the habit formation parameter e = 0:70. We suppose a quadratic
adapt , the steady-state share of adjustment costs in GDP substitutes for the steady-state share of consumtion
as h decreases and this strongly a¤ects the dynamics of these two variables.
14Quarterly parameters are transformed in monthly values.
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capital utilization cost ( = 1) and we choose ! = 1=   1 +  to normalize steady state capital
utilization rate to 1. We assume an annual ination of 2 percent, implying  = 1 + 0:02=12.
The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is assumed to be 10, and the Calvo
parameter for prices is p = 0:87
1=3 in order to reproduce the estimated elasticity of ination
with respect to the real marginal cost. Prices that are not reset may be indexed to past ination
or to trend ination. We assume that the weight p of past ination is 0.5. We follow Gertler and
Trigari (2006) and set the probability of bargaining the wage for an existing job at ow = 0:7
1=3,
implying that the average age of a wage contract is less than one year.
Finally, two parameters are set to match US data. The probability that the wage of a newly
created job is not bargained, nw, is xed in order to t the volatility of the US unemployment
series (see Table 2 below). The investment adjustment cost parameter, ', is set to match the
relative volatility of investment with respect to output for the data described in the next section.
3.2 Productivity shock
For the productivity shock, we mainly compare the ability of the various variants of our model to
match second moments of US statistics. The US data we use for this exercise are the following:
output, real hourly compensation, labor share, employment, unemployment, vacancies, hours,
output per hour and output per person. All the series are quarterly data in the non-farm business
sector from the BLS, except for unemployment,15 which is a monthly series transformed into
a quarterly one, and vacancies, which is the seasonally help wanted advertising index from
the Conference Board, available at a monthly frequency and also transformed to quarterly
frequency. Our sample runs from 1966Q1 to 2005Q4. In order to x the investment adjustment
cost parameter, we use the investment series from the US Department of Commerce - Bureau
of Economic Analysis.
All series are logged and HP-ltered with a 1600 smoothing weight. Their second moments
are reported in the second column of Table 2. The other columns contain statistics computed
from the data generated after a productivity shock respectively by (i) a model with monopolistic
labor and nominal wage stickiness, denoted MC, (ii) the model with sequential bargaining (SB),
simulated for various values of workersbargaining power in the hours negotiation and (iii) the
model with cooperatively chosen hours (CH).
The rst row of Table 2 presents the calibrated values of workersbargaining power h for
the models with bargained hours. The second row displays the corresponding elasticity of the
competitive price of labor with respect to wage. As was already clear from Figure 1, the larger
h, the lower the inuence of wages on the competitive price of labor. In particular, for h = 0:97,
this elasticity becomes zero, as in the model where hours are cooperatively chosen to maximize
the joint period surplus.
15Seasonally adjusted unemployment level (16 year and over).
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The third row is interesting as it presents nw, the wage rigidity on newly created jobs required
to reproduce the observed standard deviation of unemployment relative to output. As we know
since Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005b), the more rigid the wage of new jobs, the more vacancies
and (un)employment are volatile. Note that the higher h the less we need this type of rigidity
to reproduce the relative volatility of US labor statistics. This is good news since many have
claimed that the wage of the new jobs is actually more exible than that of existing jobs (cf. for
example Haefke et al. (2007) and Pissarides (2007)). Interestingly, in the case h = 0, i.e. the
right-to-managecase, we are never able to produce realistic unemployment relative volatility.
This can be easily understood. When the rms are left free to optimize the working time, they
will demand lots of hours from the workers with a relatively low wage and the other way round.
In some sense, the adjustment along the intensive margin is so cheap and unconstrained that they
have few incentives to adjust along the extensive margin. As h increases, rms progressively
lose this exibility and eventually, once wage does not a¤ect hours (that is if h = 0:97 or if
hours are cooperatively decided), all the workers provide the same working time, whatever their
wage.
In this particular case, the model is exactly similar to Gertler and Trigari (2006), but for the
inclusion of hours.16 The presence of hours explains that the observed unemployment relative
standard deviation can be matched with nw, the degree of wage rigidity for the newly hired
workers much lower than ow, the wage rigidity of the existing matches. This is simply because
the procyclical behavior of hours increases the expected protability of a new hire, reducing the
need for a high nw.
Note also that workersbargaining power concerning their working time directly a¤ects their
e¤ective bargaining power in the wage negotiation. For example, in the extreme case h = 0,
workers internalize the fact that high wage requirements will imply very low working time and
this reduces wage pressure. This mechanism is illustrated by the relative standard deviation of
the hourly wage: the more wage is allocational for hours, the lower the volatility of the (average)
real hourly wage. While our models are rather good at matching the unemployment volatility,
they have a harder job to produce enough volatility of total hours. From this viewpoint the
best calibration of the sequential bargaining model is h = 0:40 as it matches both relative
standard deviations. For higher values of the hours bargaining power -and for the model with
cooperatively chosen hours-, individual hours reverse too quickly to the steady state as displayed
by the serial correlation statistics. As already discussed, in the model with h = 0, it is the
contrary that happens: individual hours are too volatile since the model is able to match the
data relative standard deviation for total hours while it fails to reproduce observed employment
relative volatility.
Finally, the model with sequential bargaining and the model with cooperatively chosen hours
perform quite well with respect to the relative volatility of hourly productivity and especially of
worker productivity. However, these series are too highly correlated with output while their
16And as said above, the horizon e¤ect. However, Gertler and Trigari (2006) shows that the latter only plays
a minor role.
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Table 2: Productivity shock - summary of statistics
US data MC SB CH
h - 0.00 0.40 0.80 0.90 0.97 -
 (Hw=H) - 1.00 0.95 0.74 0.58 0.00 0.00
(nw)
3
- 0.70 0.37 0.31 0.27 0.20 0.19
 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.96
Relative standard deviation (w.r.t. output)
hourly wage 0.53 0.46 0.23 0.32 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.45
labor share 0.51 0.51 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.48
employment 0.61 - 0.27 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.40
total hours 0.84 0.71 0.84 0.82 0.70 0.67 0.64 0.64
unemployment 5.17 - 3.47 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17
vacancies 6.57 - 4.07 6.30 6.47 6.53 6.65 6.26
tensions 11.99 - 7.43 11.30 11.36 11.40 11.45 11.00
prod./hour 0.49 0.58 0.41 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.56
prod./worker 0.62 - 0.91 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63
Correlation with output
hourly wage 0.56 0.86 0.88 0.78 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.83
labor share -0.19 -0.05 -0.09 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.49
employment 0.79 - 0.47 0.87 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.94
total hours 0.87 0.83 0.91 0.92 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.85
unemployment -0.85 - -0.47 -0.87 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.94
vacancies 0.89 - 0.72 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.88
tensions 0.88 - 0.61 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.95
prod./hour 0.54 0.72 0.57 0.61 0.75 0.77 0.81 0.80
prod./worker 0.71 - 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Serial correlation
output 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.90
hourly wage 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
labor share 0.71 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.77
employment 0.94 - 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
total hours 0.92 0.75 0.88 0.87 0.77 0.75 0.73 0.73
unemployment 0.92 - 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.91
vacancies 0.92 - 0.96 0.95 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.89
tensions 0.93 - 0.97 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.92
prod./hour 0.72 0.73 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.79 0.78
prod./worker 0.78 - 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.86 0.86
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serial correlation is more in line with data. The sequential bargaining model also seems partic-
ularly good at reproducing the co-movement between output and the labor share, total hours
or vacancies. Note that for the model with h = 0:40, this is also true of unemployment.
We conclude that the models with sequential bargaing or cooperatively chosen hours do not
only provide a more complete picture of the labor market than the usual macroeconomic model
with monopolistic labor: for the subset of concepts that are common with the latter model, they
are most often at least as good in reproducing stylized facts.
From a technical point of view, it is usefull to verify that in the various rm-worker pairs,
none of the parties has an incentive to voluntarily renegate the labor contract. This can be done
by checking that Aft (wt j) > 0 and Aht (wt j) > 0: In this exercise we consider j = 9 and j = 40.
Given the bargaining probability (1   ow) = (1   0:71=3), these values correspond respectively
to a contract of the average age and a contract at percentile 99.11 of the age distribution. It is
interesting to note that, the lower h, i.e. the larger the exibility given to rms in the working
time management, the higher and the smoother (resp. the lower and the more volatile) the value
of a job for a rm (resp. for a worker) across states of nature. As h increases this inequality
decreases and it totally disappears when h = 0:97.
17 We display in Figure 2 that for contracts
lasting since 40 months it can leads to negative values in the extreme case h = 0. This problem
rapidly disappears as h increases and in particular it is overcome for h > 0:2.
3.3 Monetary policy shock
In the previous sub-section we focused on labor market variables. Let us now consider the ability
of the various model variants to produce ination persistence. In this exercise we use the MC
model as the benchmark since it has already proved to perform well on this aspect. We run our
comparative analysis on the basis of impulse response functions after an unanticipated drop of
1 percentage point in the (annual) nominal interest rate.
Figure 3 focuses on the role of the h parameter in the sequential bargaining model and
illustrates the discussion of the wage channel. For this purpose we plot the reactions of several
variables after a monetary policy shock for three values of h (0, 0:4 and 0:97). Let us remember
the aggregate variant of equation (30)
^t =
ht
H
  w^tHw
H
  ^tH
H
(37)
together with Figure 1 that graphs the values of Hw, H and H for the chosen calibration.
From this, it is obvious that for the h = 0, the wage channel is important since Hw=H =  1.
The value of the elasticity of the competitive price of labor with respect to wage is respectively
0.95 and 0 for the two other values of h. We observe that when h = 0, the model produces a
17This is because we xed w = 0:5, implying that the total surplus is equally shared between the rm and the
worker when hours are equalized across workers .
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Figure 2: Values of a job for the rm and the worker
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huge ination persistence. Indeed, marginal cost is the leading variable for ination dynamics
in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (4) and the competitive price of labor t is the major
component of the the marginal cost. For h = 0, the third term on the RHS of (37) vanishes.
As mentionedearlier, the labor force adjustment occurs mainly on the intensive margin but the
movement in hours is counterbalanced by the weakness of its associated parameter in (37).
Therefore wages are the main explanatory variable of t and of marginal cost. Furthermore, as
explained above, if rms retain the right-to-manage working hours when wage negotiations are
infrequent, this strongly reduces workersbargaining power in the wage negotiation, implying
very sticky wages. As h increases, (i) the workersbargaining power in the wage negotiation
is enhanced, leading progressively to a less sticky wage, (ii) the aggregate wage coe¢ cient in
equation (37) gets smaller but at a very slow pace, (iii) aggregate individual hours react less
strongly since more adjustment occurs along the intensive margin but the coe¢ cient of this
variable increases rapidly with h and (iv) the role of the marginal utility of consumption
increases even though it remains moderate because of the weakness of the associated parameter.
These four elements go in the same direction and contribute together to generate more volatility
in the competitive price of labor, and consequently in ination.
Figure 3: Monetary policy shock - the role of h
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The monetary policy shock is an unexpected drop in the yearly nominal interest rate by 1 ppt.
one period = one month
It is also interesting to illustrate how the Calvo parameter ow setting the probability of re-
bargaining the wage of existing jobs, interacts with parameter h to produce ination persistence.
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This is the goal of Figure 4 which compares the e¤ect of a drop from ow = 0:7
1=3 to ow = 0:2
1=3 in
the cases h = 0:4 and h = 0:97. As already stated, parameter h controls the importance of the
so-called wage channelwhile parameter ow helps to determine the wage stickiness. Obviously,
if the wage channel is is completely closed, i.e. if h = 0:97 (or if the wage is cooperatively
chosen), the competitive price of labor and the marginal cost are only marginally a¤ected by
a reduction in the probability of re-bargaining the wage even though it leads to a much higher
wage volatility. This feature is clearly an argument against models without any wage channel
since it is di¢ cult to accept that variations in wage have no impact on price setting. On the
contrary, once the wage channel is open (for example h = 0:4), any element that a¤ects wage
behavior modies ination patterns in the same direction. Of course, this is especially the case
for parameter ow. It is also interesting to note from this Figure that there is a strong interaction
between parameters ow and 
n
w. Indeed, the higher is 
o
w, the smoother are the dynamics of the
expected wage for a newly created job. This provides an incentive for vacancy posting and job
creation. At lower values of ow, the volatility of employment falls and individual hours have to
vary much more to compensate. This higher volatility of aggregate individual hours is the main
source of the small increase in ination we observe when the wage is not allocational for hours
and the Calvo probability of re-bargaining an existing job increases.18
Figure 4: Monetary policy shock - the role of ow
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The monetary policy shock is an unexpected drop in the yearly nominal interest rate by 1 ppt.
one period = one month
18This point makes clear that in the absence of a wage channel, wage only a¤ect the marginal cost indirectly
through the employment dynamics and the implied behaviour of hours. About this, see Trigari (2006).
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Finally, Table 1 and Figure 5 illustrate very similar dynamics for the models characterized by
a wage that is not allocational for hours. From this, we conclude that our variant of the sequential
bargaining model with a workersbargaining power on individual hours worked strong enough
for all workers to share the same working time is a good approximation of the Thomas (2008)
model where hours are chosen in a privately e¢ cient way to maximize the period surplus.
Figure 5: Monetary policy shock - comparing CH and SB (h = 0:97)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
total hours
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
employment
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
0.5
1
1.5
hourly wage
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-1
0
1
2
3
marginal cost
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
inflation rate (yearly)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
nominal interest rate (yearly)
CH (xow =0.7
1/3)
CH (xow =0.2
1/3)
SB (hh=0.97 x
o
w =0.7
1/3)
SB (hh=0.97 x
o
w =0.2
1/3)
The monetary policy shock is an unexpected drop in the yearly nominal interest rate by 1 ppt.
one period = one month
4 Conclusion
The present paper extends the literature on monetary models with search and matching frictions
on the labor market. It builds upon the seminal work of Trigari (2006) and Christo¤el and Linzert
(2005) on the direct link that opens in these models between wage and marginal cost when rms
are left free to manage hours worked. As exemplied by Christo¤el, Kuester and Linzert (2006),
this wage channel produces ination persistence once stickiness is introduced in the wage-
setting process. These authors explored the path opened by Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005b)
by introducing staggered wage bargaining. A priori, this should improve the performance of the
model in reproducing labor market dynamics and also generate ination persistence.
We establish that when rms retain the right-to-manage the hours worked in a framework
with staggered wage bargaining, the result is an unrealistic volatility of the individual hours and
too little volatility of employment. The reason is simply that rms can adjust easily along the
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intensive margin by asking the workers in the bottom of the wage distribution to work a lot.
This generates an unrealistic distribution of individual hours and strongly reduces the e¤ective
bargaining power of the workers in the wage negotiation.
In order to counteract these pernicious e¤ects, we amend the model to give workers the
possibility to a¤ect hours. For this we introduce a bargain on working time that is activated
every period unlike the wage bargain. We show that reducing the rmsprerogatives this way
reduces their incentive to adjust along the extensive margin and helps to produce realistic labor
market statistics. In this sense, it plays a role similar to the xed cost introduced by Christo¤el
and Kuester (2008) at the hiring rm level. Furthermore, for a wide range of values of the
workers bargaining power in the hours negotiation, the wage channel remains relatively strong
which allows to obtain ination persistence. Interestingly, our model with sequential bargaining
wage-hours encompasses as particular cases the right-to-manage model as well as a fairly close
approximation of the model where hours are cooperatively xed in an e¢ cient way .
Finally, contrarily to Gertler and Trigari (2006) or Christo¤el, Kuester and Linzert (2006),
we allow the wage of new entrants on the labor market to be more exible than those of the
existing jobs, following both intuition and recent literature (Haefke et al., 2007 and Pissarides,
2007). We show that this distinction is essential if we want to ne tune a model able to generate
at the same time a realistic labor market and ination persistence. Indeed, wage rigidity for the
new entrants is important to generate a realistic amplitude of employment dynamics while wage
rigidity for the existing jobs transmits into ination persistence through the wage channel.
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Appendix
The following Table displays labor market second moments statistics produced by the various
models while letting parameter constant accross variants. As the numbers are very similar to
those displayed in Table 2 in the main text, we may consider that small variations of the 
parameter only marginally a¤ect the dynamics of the labor market variables.
28
Table 2bis: Productivity shock - summary of statistics ( = 0:95)
US data SB
h 0.00 0.40 0.80 0.90 0.97
 (Hw=H) 1.00 0.95 0.81 0.68 0.00
(nw)
3
0.81 0.45 0.36 0.28 0.20
Relative standard deviation (w.r.t. output)
hourly wage 0.53 0.26 0.31 0.38 0.43 0.45
labor share 0.51 0.49 0.41 0.47 0.50 0.46
employment 0.61 0.27 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41
total hours 0.84 0.78 0.81 0.72 0.68 0.64
unemployment 5.17 3.47 5.17 5.17 5.17 5.17
vacancies 6.57 4.04 6.27 6.40 6.47 6.65
tensions 11.99 7.39 11.26 11.30 11.32 11.45
prod./hour 0.49 0.51 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.55
prod./worker 0.62 0.91 0.71 0.63 0.62 0.62
Correlation with output
hourly wage 0.56 0.89 0.81 0.78 0.80 0.83
labor share -0.19 -0.12 -0.11 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15
employment 0.79 0.45 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.96
total hours 0.87 0.86 0.92 0.87 0.86 0.87
unemployment -0.85 -0.45 -0.83 -0.95 -0.96 -0.96
vacancies 0.89 0.70 0.96 0.97 0.92 0.87
tensions 0.88 0.60 0.91 0.98 0.97 0.94
prod./hour 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.73 0.76 0.81
prod./worker 0.71 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98
Serial correlation
output 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.89
hourly wage 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
labor share 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69
employment 0.94 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.91
total hours 0.92 0.83 0.86 0.79 0.76 0.73
unemployment 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.91
vacancies 0.92 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.87
tensions 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.90
prod./hour 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.75 0.79
prod./worker 0.78 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.86
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